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Recent Developments 
WEITZEL v. STATE: 
Pre-Arrest Silence in the Presence of a Law Enforcement Officer Is 
Inadmissible as Direct Evidence of a Defendant's Guilt 
By: McEvan H. Baum 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a defendant's pre-
arrest silence in the presence of a law enforcement officer is 
inadmissible as direct evidence of guilt. Weitzel v. State, 384 Md. 451, 
863 A.2d 999 (2004). In so holding, the court overruled its decision in 
Key-El v. State, 349 Md. 811, 709 A.2d 1305 (1998), which held that 
pre-arrest silence was admissible against a defendant if it satisfied tacit 
admission prerequisites. Furthermore, the court held the trial court's 
error in admitting evidence of the defendant's pre-arrest silence was 
not harmless. 
On March 17, 2002, police responded to a 911 call in 
Baltimore County. At the scene, they found Mark Weitzel ("Weitzel") 
and Thomas Crabtree ("Crabtree") near a severely injured woman 
positioned at the bottom of a public stairwell. Weitzel was arrested 
after Officer Frederick Johnson ("Johnson") conducted a brief on-
scene investigation. 
Prior to trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the 
State gave notice that it planned to introduce Weitzel's silence after 
Crabtree told Johnson that Weitzel threw the victim down the stairs, as 
a "tacit admission." Weitzel subsequently filed a motion in limine to 
preclude the tacit admission. • 
During a hearing on Weitzel's motion, Crabtree testified 
regarding the events preceding Weitzel's arrest. He stated that earlier 
in the afternoon, he observed Weitzel smoking cocaine and drinking 
vodka within two hours prior to Johnson's arrival. Crabtree also 
testified that he punched Weitzel several times shortly before the 
police arrived. 
Officer Johnson testified he interviewed Crabtree in Weitzel's 
presence, and Weitzel appeared to be conscious and cognizant. 
According to Johnson, Weitzel remained silent while Crabtree accused 
Weitzel of throwing the woman down the stairs. After Johnson 
informed Weitzel that he was under arrest for pushing the victim down 
the stairs, Weitzel remained silent but complied with Johnson's order 
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to submit to handcuffing. He also maintained his silence when asked 
if he understood his Miranda rights, and wanted to make a statement, 
though he did provide oral responses to routine booking questions. 
At trial, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County allowed 
Weitzel's silence to be used against him as tacit admission evidence. 
The court found Weitzel was alert and coherent at the time he was 
questioned. After trial, Weitzel was convicted of second-degree 
assault and received a ten-year sentence. The Court of Special 
Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari to consider whether the court erred in 
allowing the State to admit Weitzel's silence during the police 
investigation as substantive evidence of his guilt. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first addressed whether 
police presence, combined with a defendant's participation in recent 
illegal activity separate from the investigated offense, rendered his pre-
arrest silence "too ambiguous to be admissible." Weitzel, 384 Md. at 
454, 863 A.2d at 1001. Weitzel argued that his silence was 
"inherently ambiguous" because a jury's determination that it was an 
admission of guilt could only be speculative since it could have been a 
means to hide his recent drug use or the result of head trauma. !d. at 
455, 863 A.2d at 1001. Moreover, he contended, even if his silence 
were admissible, the circuit court abused its discretion by concluding 
that a reasonable person would have responded to Crabtree's 
accusations. Id. 
The court began its analysis of the issue by discussing its 
earlier holding in Key-El v. State. Id. at 456, 863 A.2d at 1001 (citing 
Key-El, 349 Md. 811, 709 A.2d 1305 (1998)). In Key-El, the court held 
that pre-arrest silence is admissible if it satisfies the prerequisites for a 
tacit admission. Id. Since Key-El, many courts have held such 
evidence to be inadmissible because 
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it either violates the Fifth 
Amendment or is too ambiguous to be probative. Id. at 456, 863 A.2d 
at 1002. The court further examined United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 
171 (1975), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a 
defendant's silence during an initial police interrogation is 
inadmissible as a tacit admission because the ambiguity of such silence 
outweighs the probative value in most circumstances. Weitzel, 384 
Md. at 457, 863 A.2d at 1002. 
In examining the reasoning of other state courts which had held 
similarly, the court looked to Ex Parte Marek, 556 So.2d 375, 382 
(Ala.1989). Id. at 458-59, 863 A.2d at 1003. In Marek, the Alabama 
Supreme Court rejected the notion that an accused individual who 
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considers himself innocent will deny an accusation. Id at 459, 863 
A.2d at 1003. In rejecting such logic, the Marek court abolished the 
tacit admission rule in pre-arrest and post-arrest situations, reasoning 
that the accused may have many motives for remaining silent other 
than guilt. !d. at 459, 863 A.2d at 1003-04. 
Continuing its analysis, the Court of Appeals next looked to 
People of NY v. DeGeorge, 73 N.Y.2d 614 (1989), wherein the New 
York Court of Appeals held that "pre-arrest silence in the presence of 
police officers is inadmissible at trial because silence is the natural 
reaction of many people in the presence of law enforcement officers." 
!d. at 460, 863 A.2d at 1004. There, the New York Court of Appeals 
stated not only does silence lack probative value, but its admission 
may also create a substantial risk of prejudice by jurors who are not 
sensitive to the myriad of alternative explanations for a defendant's 
pretrial silence. !d. Finally, the court looked to Combs v. Coyle, 205 
F.3d 269, 283 (2000), wherein the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit held the use of pre-arrest silence as substantive guilt 
was "an impermissible burden upon the exercise of the privilege 
against self-incrimination." Jd. at 460-61, 863 A.2d at 1004. 
The Court of Appeals concluded its analysis by that holding 
pre-arrest silence while in the presence of police is not admissible as 
substantive evidence of guilt. Jd. 461, 863 A.2d at 1005. The court 
reasoned that popular entertainment has given the average American 
citizen the perception that any statement made in the presence of 
police can be used against one in a court of law. Id. at 461, 863 A.2d 
at 1004-05. Therefore, the meaning of one's silence in the presence of 
police is ambiguous at best. !d. at 461, 863 A.2d at 1005. 
In conclusion, the court discussed the State's claim that the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. !d. The court 
explained, in order for an error to be harmless, the court must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence 
the verdict. !d. The court reasoned that because both the victim and 
Weitzel had no memory of the incident, and the only direct evidence 
presented was Crabtree's testimony, the circumstantial indication of 
guilt implied by Weitzel's silence was the only evidence to corroborate 
Crabtree's account. !d. at 461-62, 863 A.2d at 1005. The court 
broached the possibility that because Crabtree was the only other 
individual present at the scene, he would clearly have a motive for 
fabricating his testimony. !d. Based on its inability to conclude that 
the evidence did not influence the verdict, the court reversed and 
remanded the case for a new trial. !d. 
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In this case, the court establishes that pre-arrest silence in the 
presence of a police officer cannot be admitted as substantive evidence 
of guilt. In so holding, the court recognizes that suspects may have a 
multitude of reasons for remaining silent. Prosecutors should be 
forewarned that introducing evidence of a defendant's pre-arrest 
silence could be grounds for reversal, even where such evidence is not 
initially precluded by the defendant's motion in limine. 
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